Resource requirements and speed versus geometry of unconditionally
  secure physical key exchanges by Gonzalez, Elias et al.
Resource requirements and speed versus geometry of
unconditionally secure physical key exchanges
Elias Gonzalez 1,*, Robert S. Balog 1 and Laszlo B. Kish 1
1 Texas A&M University Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 3128
TAMU College Station, TX 77843, U.S.A.
* corresponding author eliasg23@tamu.edu
Abstract
The imperative need for unconditional secure key exchange is expounded by the increasing
connectivity of networks and by the increasing number and level of sophistication of cyberattacks.
Two concepts that are information theoretically secure are quantum key distribution (QKD) and
Kirchoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN). However, these concepts require a dedicated connection be-
tween hosts in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks which can be impractical and or cost prohibitive.
A practical and cost effective method is to have each host share their respective cable(s) with
other hosts such that two remote hosts can realize a secure key exchange without the need of an
additional cable or key exchanger. In this article we analyze the cost complexities of cable, key
exchangers, and time required in the star network. We mentioned the reliability of the star network
and compare it with other network geometries. We also conceived a protocol and equation for the
number of secure bit exchange periods needed in a star network. We then outline other network
geometries and trade-off possibilities that seem interesting to explore.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation for a secure network
In the advent of intelligent vehicle information networks [1], the smart power grid [2], and the Internet
of Things (IoT ) [3], current infrastructure is becoming increasingly dependent on cyber networks. This
dependency makes current infrastructure a larger more attractive target for cyberattacks, such that
the National Security Agency (NSA) director stated the U.S. power grid could be shut down with a
cyberattack [4].
Secure communication channels are needed to prevent eavesdropping or intervention. Increasingly
though, communications is directed away from expensive, dedicated networks in favor of the open
internet. In order to ensure secure communications, security keys are needed to set up a secure commu-
nication. The keys are generated, and shared via a publicly accessible channel by secure key distribution
protocols. Consider a secure key exchange between Alice and Bob, Alice and Bob must consider that
an eavesdropper (Eve) is trying to extract the key as illustrated in Figure 1. Secure key exchanges can
be categorized as either software-based or hardware-based.
Software-based key exchanges are based on mathematical algorithms with the assumption that Eve
does not have enough computing resources to crack the key. In essence, software-based key exchanges
offer no security from an information theoretical point of view. The security is only (computationally-)
conditional and is not future-proof, meaning that with enough computing resources the key can be ex-
tracted. The advantages of software-based key exchanges are the low cost, hardware communicator is
not required, and the keys can be exchanged over the Internet, thus eliminating the need of extra infras-
tructure. The other option is hardware-based key exchange, these offer an advantage of unconditional
security.
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Figure 1: An illustration of Alice and Bob in a secure key exchange while Eve is seeking to tap the
communication channel and extract the key.
1.2 Hardware-based secure key exchanges
The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [5] and the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) [6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] secure key exchange are two examples of
hardware-based secure key exchange concepts that are information theoretically secure [27]. Thus even
with infinite computing resources the key will not be extracted by Eve, because the security offered by
these schemes are based on fundamental laws of physics, to crack the key exchange would require Eve
to break the underpinning laws of physics. The main disadvantage of hardware-based key exchanges
is the higher cost, as they require a physical communicator at each host, and a dedicated connection
between communicators. Such communication schemes can be considered peer-to-peer (P2P) [28].
The QKD key exchange utilizes the quantum no-cloning theorem of quantum mechanics [5] to
distribute key bits. In theory it is information theoretically secure, however the physical implementation
of QKD has been debated and the method has been hacked [29, 30, 31, 32].
The KLJN key exchange utilizes the laws and properties of classical mechanics [6] to generate and
distribute key bits. In the KLJN key exchange depicted in Figure 2, Alice and Bob have two identical
resistor pairs, RL and RH (the values of the resistors are such that RL ¡ RH) which represents the low
RL and high RH bits respectively. At the beginning of each bit exchange period, the communicators
randomly generate a bit value and connect the corresponding resistor to the wire line. The effective
value of the resulting thermal noise in the cable has three possible levels. When it is at the intermediate
level, Alice and Bob will know that the other party has the opposite bit value than their own. Thus a
secure bit exchange took place because Eve, while she also knows that Alice and Bob have opposite bit
values, she does not know who has the RL value and who has the RH value [6, 8].
1.3 Secure key exchange over P2P networks and the fully connected net-
work
Hardware-based key exchanges require P2P networks with a dedicated connection to each host. For
very large networks this will be costly due to the infrastructure (cables) and key exchangers. The
cost complexity of the growth for different networks can be denoted by Tcable(N) for number of cables,
Tke(N) for number of key exchangers, and Ttime(N) for amount of time required or speed to complete
a secure bit exchange, with N representing the number of hosts in the network.
A simple method to construct P2P networks is a fully connected network also known as the complete
graph in graph theory. The fully connected network is illustrated in Figure 3. The fully connected
network does not require a protocol since every host in the network has a dedicated connection with
every other host in the network, and can process a secure bit exchange with any other host at any
time simultaneously. This network has N − 1 key exchangers per host and scales with the order of
N2 for cables and key exchangers, which makes this network impractical for very large networks. The
complexities are Tcable(N) ∈ O(N2), Tke(N) ∈ O(N2), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(1). We will denote the fully
connected network with N − 1 key exchangers per host as FCNN−1. The fully connected network has
N −1 key exchangers for every host resulting in (N −1) ·N total key exchangers for the entire network,
N − 1 direct connections for every host resulting in (N − 1) · N/2 total cables for the entire network.
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Figure 2: An illustration of a KLJN system. Alice and Bob each have a communicator which have
noise generators, a low resistor RL, and a high resistor RH. The noise voltages are enhanced by Johnson
noise UA,L or UA,H for Alice; and UB,L or UB,H for Bob, which is measured between the wire and the
ground. Once the communicators select a resistor they measure the mean-squared voltage amplitude
< U2ch(t) > and or the current amplitude < I
2
ch(t) >.
The advantage the fully connected network has is time, as every host in the network can simultaneously
process a secure bit exchange with every other host in the network.
If the cost of having (N − 1) ·N key exchangers for the entire network is too costly, then a trade-off
between the number of key exchangers and speed might be preferable. If there is only one key exchanger
per host in the fully connected network then the complexities for the fully connected network will be;
Tcable(N) ∈ O(N2), Tke(N) ∈ O(N), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(N), and will require a protocol which we will
denote as FCN1 to process a secure bit exchange with every host in the network.
The fully connected network is robust and reliable as it does not depend on a single cable or key
exchanger. If there is cable destruction or a damaged key exchanger then only the hosts connected by
that cable or key exchanger will be affected, and only that connection will be affected. The affected
hosts will still be able to process a secure bit exchange with other hosts which do not depend on the
damaged cable or key exchanger.
To add additional hosts to the fully connected network will be trivial since it does not have a
protocol. In the case of FCN1 the protocol will need to consider the added host.
1.4 Linear chain network with two key exchangers per host
Linear chain networks also know as bus networks or daisy chain networks, contain a single line and two
key exchanges per host as illustrated in Figure 4, and were analyzed in [33] in the contexts of smart
grids. The linear chain network with 2 key exchangers per host has complexities of Tcable(N) ∈ O(N),
Tke(N) ∈ O(N), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(N2). By having 2 key exchanges per host the linear chain network
can process 2 simultaneous secure bit exchanges as long as one host is downstream, say host i−a for
any positive integer a and the other host is upstream, say host i+b for any positive integer b of the
ith host. The first host and the last host are special cases which cannot have simultaneous secure key
exchanges with other hosts [33].
The reliability of the linear chain network is dependent on the cable. If there is damage to the cable
then the network will become two different networks divided at the location of the damaged cable, and
the two networks cannot process a secure bit exchange with each other. The linear chain network is
more robust if there is damage to a key exchanger, then only the host with the damaged key exchanger
will be slowed down but will be able connect with all other hosts in the network since there are two
key exchangers per host.
If an additional host joins the network with N hosts then the protocol will consider N + 1 hosts
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Figure 3: An illustration of a fully connected network with N − 1 communicators per host (denoted as
FCNN−1) has complexities of Tcable(N) ∈ O(N2), Tke(N) ∈ O(N2), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(1).
instead of N , this will be a relatively simple fix as the the protocol can be preprogrammed in the hosts
for any N .
Figure 4: An illustration of a linear chain network with 2 key exchangers per host has complexities of
Tcable(N) ∈ O(N), Tke(N) ∈ O(N), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(N2).
2 Results and Discussion
2.1 Star network
The star network is a hub and spoke topology with a center switch like an old telephone exchange
switch system, and has branches connected to the center. We denote the star network protocol with
one key exchanger per host as STAR. The complexities of the star network are Tcable(N) ∈ O(N),
Tke(N) ∈ O(N), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(N). Figure 5 is an example of a star network with N branches.
The most efficient protocol in the star network is similar to the protocol in the linear chain network
in regards to first connecting to the nearest neighbors, then connecting the second nearest neighbors,
and so on. The star network allows for faster speed than the linear chain network with similar cable
and hardware complexities.
2.2 Graph theory and previous work on the star network
In graph theory the hosts are considered vertices and the cables are considered edges [34]. The protocol
of the star network is to connect every host in the network to process a secure bit exchange with
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Figure 5: An illustration of a star network system with one key exchanger per host has complexities of
Tcable(N) ∈ O(N), Tke(N) ∈ O(N), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(N).
every other host in the network in the least number of Secure Bit Exchange Period (SBEP) steps. In
graph theory the star network protocol can be described as a special case of a edge-color problem [35]
known as round-robin(RR) tournament or all-play-all tournament problem [36]. The number k of edge
colors needed in graph theory is the number of SBEPs needed in the star network protocol, although
many geometric structures and edge-color problems have been studied in graph theory [37, 38, 39,
40, 41, 42, 43] and applied to various infrastructure networks [44, 45, 46, 47], it has not been applied
to P2P hardware-based secure key exchange networks other than [33]. Many network applications
assume overlapping signals in the same channel is possible, and do not have a dedicated channel in
which every vertex connects with every other vertex. For QKD and KLJN network applications these
networks require dedicated communication channels with no overlapping signals, and RR solutions to
different geometric structures. The star network protocol presented in section 2.2 is specifically for QKD
and KLJN networks, and is significant since it combines residual SBEP steps whenever possible, thus
lowering the total number of SBEPs needed, after a thorough literature review a similar RR solution
was not found and the most similar solution found is in [39].
2.3 Protocol and analysis of the star network
For a network with N hosts the star key exchange network protocol begins with every odd numbered
host say ith host with i being odd and processes a secure bit exchange with their upstream nearest
neighbor, that is host i+1, this will take one Secure Bit Exchange Period (SBEP) and the secure key
exchange between different hosts will occur simultaneously. For example, host 1 will process a secure
bit exchange with host 2, while host 3 will process a secure bit exchange with host 4, while host N − 1
will process a secure bit exchange with host N if N is even, or host N − 2 will process a secure bit
exchange with host N − 1 if N is odd. If N is odd, then the last host, that is host N , will not process
a secure bit exchange in the first SBEP step. The next step in the protocol is for every even numbered
host say ith host with i being even will process a secure bit exchange with their nearest upstream
neighbor, say host i+1, simultaneously. For example, host 2 will process a secure bit exchange with
host 3, while host 4 will process a secure bit exchange with host 5, while host N − 1 will process a
secure bit exchange with host N if N is even, or host N will process a secure bit exchange with host 1 if
N is odd, note that the protocol will wrap around from the last host N to the first host 1. The circular
nature of the star network is a reason why it is faster than the linear chain network with similar cable
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Figure 6: An illustration of the example of the star network protocol STAR for a network with 5 hosts.
It takes six SBEP steps for every host in the network to process a secure bit exchange with every other
host.
(a) 1st SBEP step (b) 2nd SBEP step (c) 3rd SBEP step
(d) 4th SBEP step (e) 5th SBEP step (f) 6th SBEP step
and hardware complexities. The star network protocol STAR then continues with every odd host to
process a secure bit exchange with their upstream second nearest neighbor, that is every ith host with
i being odd with host i+2, then the even numbered hosts will process a secure bit exchange with their
second nearest neighbor, say every ith host with i being even with host i+2. The protocol continues by
having every host process a secure bit exchange with their third nearest neighbors, then fourth nearest
neighbors, and continues until every host in the network has processed a secure bit exchange with every
other host.
As an example Figure 6 illustrates every step of the protocol STAR for a network with 5 hosts. The
first SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated in sub-figure 6a, note how every odd numbered host i has a
secure bit exchange with their next upstream nearest neighbor host i+1. The second SBEP step in the
protocol is illustrated in sub-figure 6b, note how every even numbered host i has a secure bit exchange
with their next upstream nearest neighbor host i+1. The third SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated
in sub-figure 6c. Since the number of hosts in the network is odd it will take additional SBEP steps
to process a secure bit exchange with these remaining hosts, these are residual SBEP steps. Note how
the last host wraps around to the first host. The fourth SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated in
sub-figure 6d. In this SBEP step every odd numbered host i has a secure bit exchange with their second
upstream nearest neighbor host i+2. The fifth SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated in sub-figure 6e,
this step is similar to step 4 except that now the even numbered hosts process a secure bit exchange with
their second upstream nearest neighbors. The sixth and last SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated in
sub-figure 6f. Since N is odd the protocol requires additional residual SBEP steps to process a secure
bit exchange with the remaining hosts. Note that for this example of the STAR protocol with N = 5
hosts requires six SBEP steps for every host in the network to process a secure bit exchange with every
host. Table 1 demonstrates what every host is doing at every step in the protocol of this example as
illustrated in Figure 6. Table 2 is the legend for table 1. The arrow symbol “→” is used as x → y
meaning host x is processing a secure bit exchange with host y. The star symbol “F” means the host
of this row is being utilized. The circle symbol “©” means the host of this row is not active.
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Host (a) 1st SBEP (b) 2nd SBEP (c) 3rd SBEP (d) 4th SBEP (e) 5th SBEP (f) 6th SBEP
1 1 → 2 © F 1 → 3 F ©
2 F 2 → 3 © 2 → 4 © F
3 3 → 4 F © F 3 → 5 ©
4 F 4 → 5 © F 4 → 1 ©
5 © F 5 → 1 © F 5 → 2
Table 1: This table demonstrates what every host is doing at every SBEP step in the protocol STAR
as described in the example and illustrated in Figure 6.
Symbol Meaning of symbols in table 1
x→ y Host x processing a secure bit exchange with host y.
F Host of this row is being utilized.
© Host of this row is inactive.
Table 2: This table is the legend of table 1
The number of SBEPs needed in the STAR protocol is dependent on the number of hosts N in the
network. Table 3 shows the number of SBEPs needed in the star network for every host to process
a secure bit exchange with every other host in the network, for star networks with up to 20 hosts.
Figure 7 is the plot of table 3, with N being the independent variable and SBEP being the dependent
variable. The linear regression line is f(N) = 1.3192982456 · N − 1.301754386, and the coefficient of
determination is R2 = 0.988989157.
N , number of hosts in star network SBEP(N), number of SBEP steps
needed for a network with N
hosts
2 1
3 3
4 3
5 6
6 6
7 8
8 8
9 12
10 12
11 14
12 14
13 17
14 17
15 19
16 19
17 22
18 22
19 24
20 24
Table 3: This table shows the number of SBEPs needed in star networks with 2 hosts to 20 hosts, with
every host in the network to process a secure bit exchange with every other host.
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Figure 7: This is the plot of table 3. The data points are plotted along with a linear regression line which
is f(N) = 1.3192982456 · N − 1.301754386, and the coefficient of determination is R2 = 0.988989157.
The horizontal axis is N meaning the number of hosts in the star network. The vertical axis is SBEP(N)
meaning the number of SBEP steps needed for a network with N hosts.
The patterns and relations in the star network protocol can be seen in table 3 and Figure 7. Note
that when N is evenly divisible by 2 then it will take exactly 2 SBEP steps for every host i to process a
secure bit exchange with their nearest neighbor host i+1. If N is not evenly divisible by 2 then it will
take exactly 3 SBEP steps for every host i to process a secure bit exchange with their nearest neighbor
host i+1. The results are the same for every case when N is divided by 3, 4, 5, ..., (N − 1)/2, and
every host i processes a secure bit exchange with their second, third, fourth, ..., (N − 2)/2th nearest
neighbor, that is host i+2, i+3, i+4, ..., i+(N − 2) respectively. There is a unique case when N is
even and is divided by N/2, in this case only one SBEP step is needed to process a secure bit exchange.
The residual steps are combined whenever possible. For example, in the case when N = 7, the 6th
and 9th steps can be combined into one step resulting in one less SBEP step. These patterns and
relations were used to conceive equations (1a) through (1d), where the “de” symbol in the equations is
the ceiling function, N is the number of hosts and SBEP(N) is the number of SBEPs needed to share
an independent secure bit for each possible pairs formed in the network, which means each host share
N − 1 secure bits. (Note, after this sharing, each possible pairs formed in the network has only a single
bit of their respective secure key. Thus to share a key with k bits, the above process must be repeated
k times.)
SBEP(N) = N +
⌈
N
4
⌉
− 2 for N ≤ 8 and N is even. (1a)
SBEP(N) = N +
⌈
N
4
⌉
− 1 for N ≤ 8 and N is odd. (1b)
SBEP(N) = N +
⌈
N
4
⌉
− 1 for N > 8 and N is even. (1c)
SBEP(N) = N +
⌈
N
4
⌉
for N > 8 and N is odd. (1d)
The reliability of the star network is dependent on its center switch, cable, and key exchanger. One
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could sabotage the entire network just by damaging the center switch in the star network. If a cable or
key exchanger is damaged in the star network then the affected host will be effectively disconnected from
the entire network, but the unaffected hosts will be able to continue processing a secure bit exchange
with other hosts in the network.
To add additional hosts in the star network will require every hosts in the network to change the
protocol from N to N+1, which is a relatively simple process since the protocols can be preprogrammed
in the hosts.
The star network could be utilized in many situations including vehicle information networks [48, 49]
and inside equipment with components spread around a central processing unit such as a computer.
2.4 Comparing network topologies
Table 4 compares the fully connected network with N−1 key exchangers per host denoted by FCNN−1,
the fully connected network with 1 key exchanger per host denoted by FCN1, the linear chain network
protocol with 2 key exchangers per hosts is denoted by LCH, and the star network protocol with 1
communicator per host denoted by STAR. As can be seen from table 4 the fastest network is the
FCNN−1 network, the networks with the least cost of cables are the linear chain network and the star
network, and the networks with the least cost of key exchangers are FCN1, linear chain network, and
star network. These results will hold for both KLJN and QKD systems. These results show that the
star network has better performance than the linear chain network with similar cost of cables and key
exchangers.
Network type Tcable(N) Tke(N) Ttime(N)
FCNN−1 O(N2) O(N2) O(1)
FCN1 O(N
2) O(N) O(N)
LCH O(N) O(N) O(N2)
STAR O(N) O(N) O(N)
Table 4: This table summarizes the complexities of the fully connected networks FCNN−1 and FCN1,
the linear chain network protocol LCH, and the star network protocol STAR.
The robustness and reliability of each network is dependent on its geometric topology. If a cable
is damaged then it is best to have a FCNN−1 network since only one connection between two hosts
will be lost. In the linear chain network the entire network will be divided. In the star network the
affected host will be completely disconnected from the network. If a key exchanger is damaged then it
is best to have a linear chain network since the only consequences will be a slower secure bit exchange
process, but every host will still be able to process a secure bit exchange with every other host. In
the FCNN−1 network a damaged key exchanger will only affect one connection between two hosts. In
the star network a damaged key exchanger will completely disconnect the affected host from the entire
network. Another weakness of the star network is the center switch, if the center switch is damaged then
the entire network is disconnected. Based on these three networks one can argue that the most robust
reliable network is the FCNN−1 followed by the linear chain network, and the least robust network of
these three would be the star network.
To add hosts to the FCNN−1 network would be trivial since the FCNN−1 does need a protocol, all
that is needed is to connect the host to every other host. To add hosts to the linear chain network and
the star network will require every hosts in the network to change the protocol from N hosts to N + 1
hosts, this will be a relatively simple process as every host can be preprogrammed.
2.5 Open questions and future studies
The star network has complexity of O(N) for the number of cables, key exchangers, and time, but there
are still numerous other geometric network topologies that have not been explored that might benefit
KLJN and QKD systems. Other examples for possible networks include matrix networks, that is a
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grid of several vertical lines and horizontal lines. The matrix network might be a good model for an
urban city with squared blocks. A wheel network is another possibility that might outperform the star
network. A wheel network is similar to a star network but with a connecting loop around the branches.
A web network is another interesting network similar to the wheel network but with concentric circles
connecting the inner branches. A web network is similar to a spider web with each node being a host.
A cube network is another interesting possibility that could be utilized in a skyscraper. A cube network
is similar to the matrix network except that it is three dimensions. A sphere network might be another
interesting three-dimensional network that can be compared with the cube network.
Since different geometrical topologies give different trade-offs, another interest is to explore the
trade-offs of the different networks, and why it is preferable to sacrifice speed, communicators, or key
exchangers for infrastructure and vice versa. Another possible interest is to analyze and compare every
geometric network with different number of communicators and how well they scale with speed. Another
possibility is to combine several of these networks into one network and analyze its performance, in
graph theory this is known as hybrid networks.
Different geometic network structures have different vulnerabilites, an analysis of each network’s
vulnerabilites, robustness, reliability, and different kinds of attacks would be interesting to explore and
compare.
3 Conclusions
In this study we considered the need for unconditional secure key exchange along with the need to
have P2P networks since QKD and KLJN require P2P networks. We reviewed a simple P2P network
known as the fully connected network. We also reviewed the linear chain network and analyzed the
star network to compared it with fully connected networks and the linear chain network. We conceived
a protocol and equations (1a) through (1d) to describe the star network. The results show that the
star network compares favorably to the linear chain network and the fully connected network. Even
though the star network utilizes only one key exchanger per host, its time complexity is superior to
that of the linear chain network, while its cable complexity is the same. The star network’s cable and
key exchanger complexity is superior to that of the fully connected network, while its time complexity
is worse than FCNN−1, but is similar to FCN1. We found that the star network fairs worse than the
linear chain network and the fully connected network in robustness and reliability as the star network
can be entirely disconnected by damaging the center switch. We then considered several other possible
network geometries that might be interesting to explore and to compare.
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